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South African crime rates rose to unacceptably high levels between 1980 and 
2006. As a result, vast amounts of funds were devoted to the upkeep of the 
criminal justice system – correctional services, justice and the police. Although it 
is necessary to spend a certain amount on the criminal justice system, in South 
Africa this expenditure was excessive by most measures. The excess funds that 
were spent on the upkeep of the criminal justice system could have covered the 
cost of financing the entire backlog in schooling facilities and a large part of the 
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1 Department of Economics and Accountancy respectively, University of Stellenbosch. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most agonising problems that South Africa currently faces is the high 
incidence of crime and an accompanying general sense of lawlessness. The aim of this 
paper is  to  show that  the magnitude of the impact that crime on the South African 
economy has been substantial.  
 
The first part of this paper will be devoted to establishing what crime entails and how 
standard economic theory encapsulates the determinants of crime. The South African 
crime situation will be compared to those of other countries. It will be shown that the 
crime rate in South Africa is high by global standards. In the second section, the direct 
economic implications of crime will be discussed. For the purpose of this paper the direct 
economic implications of crime will be defined as government expenditure on the 
criminal justice system. It will be shown that for the period 1980-2006 government 
expenditure on the upkeep of the criminal justice system was  excessive. The 
excessiveness of these costs will be quantified and an opportunity cost figure will be 








What constitutes criminal behaviour? In this section it will be shown that there is no 
universal definition of crime. The extent of the crime situation in South Africa, as well as 
the level of domestic crime compared to other countries, will be investigated in order to 
determine how South Africa squares off with its international counterparts. 
 
2.2 Defining crime 
 
Criminologists disagree about the exact definition of crime. One of the main reasons 
appears to be their attempt to derive a definition of crime that is applicable to all 
societies. The word crime is derived from the Latin word crimen which means “reproach” 
or “accusation” (Harries, 2007: 5). But what exactly does crime entail and where does it 
originate? Anthropologists have been struggling for years to pinpoint the exact nature of   2 
crime. This is partly due to the fact that the nature of crime is largely determined by 
culture. In other words, while certain actions may be regarded as criminal within one 
culture,  they will not necessarily be viewed as criminal within another. While  the 
consumption of wine is regarded as a crime in Saudi Arabia this is not the case in South 
Africa. Crime does not remain constant within a given culture either. In South Africa, for 
example, same sex marriages were regarded as a crime until they were legalised in 2006. 
Despite these variations,  criminal behaviour can only be regarded as such if this 
behaviour is comparable with a crime yardstick, i.e. if the nature of crime is precisely 
defined.  
 
The most commonly applied definition of crime is  in legal terms. An act is only 
considered a crime when it is prohibited by criminal law and violates the prevailing legal 
code of the jurisdiction in which it occurs (Muncie, 2001: 10). According to Williams 
(2001: 12) an act constitutes a crime if it involves any harm incurred to society, breaches 
a legal rule and is subject to legal punishment, i.e. if it violates the criminal law.  Hence 
the yardstick for determining whether an act is a crime or not is the criminal law of a 
specific country. Since criminal law includes informal norms of a given society it follows 
that the nature of criminal law differs from one society to another. While in Holland 
dealing in marijuana is dealt with rather leniently, it is punishable by death in Malaysia. 
As these informal norms in a society change, so does the criminal law.   
 
Where does criminal law originate? Criminal law can be viewed as the social consensus 
of a given society on what behaviour is generally accepted and what behaviour is 
punishable by the state. However, as was the case in South Africa, criminal law can also 
serve the select interests of certain groups. For decades, industrial, mining and 
agricultural institutions aligned themselves with the apartheid government in South 
Africa to exploit black labour (Lowenberg and Kaempfer, 2001: 1). Laws such as the 
Native Labour Act and the Group Areas Act were passed to safeguard the interests of the 
ruling capitalist class.  
 
For the purpose of this paper crime will be regarded as the result of the interplay of 
political, economic, and social factors in society. Regardless of the exact nature of the 
problem, criminal policy makers have to carefully consider the key factors that drive 
South Africa’s high crime rates. To this end it is crucially important to understand the 
underlying economic theory of crime in South Africa. 
   3 
2.3 Economic theory of crime 
 
Research has indicated that criminal behaviour is a result of rational choice (Blackmore, 
2003: 444). An individual will consider various employment opportunities and will 
generally opt for the occupation that yields the highest return. Brown (2001: 273) refers 
to a cost benefit exercise that would-be criminals go through when considering criminal 
activities vis-à-vis legitimate forms of employment. Therefore criminal patterns of 
thought are more rational than is generally expected. Potential criminals will compare 
payoffs between criminal and legitimate activities and if there is a substantial differential, 
i.e. if the return from committing the crime exceeds the return from more legitimate 
pursuits, the propensity to commit the crime will increase. 
 
The conventional approach to this problem is to raise the costs associated with 
committing crime, i.e. increase expenditure on the criminal justice system in order to 
increase the possibility that criminals will be apprehended, convicted and punished for 
crime (Blackmore, 2003: 444). But there is a growing body of evidence that this is not the 
most effective policy vehicle for combating crime. The international perspective on the 
interaction between crime, criminal justice, and poverty reduction is changing. The 
World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme are reconsidering their 
funding policies for criminal justice reform. Empirical evidence in Blackmore (2003) and 
Brown (2001) supports this approach in its conclusion that expenditure on the South 
African criminal justice system is not the most important variable in deterring crime. 
Some authors even exclude government expenditure on the criminal justice system, 
which is probably the most visible policy tool, as an explanatory variable in their 
empirical work (Demombynes and Ozler, 2002). 
 
Blackmore (2003) analysed 10 independent variables in relation to 15 types of crime, 
including expenditure on the criminal justice system, which he found to be the least 
significant explanatory variable. This was confirmed in a study by Stone (2006) in which 
he concluded that expenditure on the criminal justice system contributes very little to 
combat crime and in some cases may even worsen the problem. In his analysis, 
Blackmore found a positive correlation between expenditure on the criminal justice   4 
system  and crime, for which he offered various explanations. Among these was the 
possibility of a non-linear relation or the result of causality extending from crime to 
expenditure on the criminal justice system, i.e. higher crime rates necessitated increased 
expenditure on the criminal justice system. 
 
In many countries government expenditure on the criminal justice system is the main 
direct cost that is associated with crime. In South Africa, however, businesses seem to 
bear the brunt of the direct costs associated with crime. According to the South African 
Institute of Race Relations (2006: 507) the number of people who are employees in 
private security rose by 150% between 1997 and 2005. In 2005 there were no less than 
2.7 private security officers for every sworn police official. The World Bank’s 
Investment Climate Survey (Clark et. al., 2005: 95-98) estimates the costs of crime in 
South Africa at approximately 1.1% of businesses’ sales. How do these cost implications 
for businesses in the private sector impact on economic growth? 
 
The general perception is that crime hampers growth because it diverts resources away 
from productive activity to protection efforts (Demombynes and Ozler, 2002). Crime is a 
major contributing factor to the emigration of professional skills  and  discourages 
investment, which inhibits long term growth. According to Stone (2006), there are seven 
crime related factors that may restrain economic growth. 
 
Firstly, businesses suffer direct losses and have to incur costs to enhance security 
measures. The diversion of funds from more productive operational activities reduces 
profits. The cost of motor claims in the insurance industry, for example, accounts for 
approximately 30% of all insurance claims paid out (SA’s short-term insurance industry 
contributes to fight against crime, 2006). Secondly, governments have to spend more on 
law enforcement, curtailing funds for other, more productive, uses. Thirdly, households 
tend to spend more on security measures and health care rather than on school fees and 
other investments of a more productive nature. Fourthly, crime injures or destroys human 
capital or erodes human capital through the emigration of highly sought after professional 
skills. Fifthly, crime prevents people from entering the labour market when this entails 
working after hours or far from home. Sixthly, crime discourages foreign investment and 
lastly, crime disrupts efforts in support of economic growth such as schooling and public 
transport. 
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Stone (2006) presented these seven factors in two main hypotheses: The first states that 
crime imposes direct and indirect costs on businesses, eroding their profits  and 
hampering investment. According to the  second hypothesis economic growth is 
hampered by limiting investment, work and leisure activities and discouraging tourism. 
 
In South Africa crime also constrains growth indirectly by creating the perception of 
instability, especially in the light of the prevalence of violent crime. The World Bank’s 
Investment Crime Survey (Clark et. al., 2005: 88) suggests that 30% of South African 
businesses regard crime as a major constraint to investment. Businesses lose production 
time and profits by incurring losses from robbery and excessive expenditure on crime 
prevention. This discourages economic growth, since businesses  may limit their 
investment due to the perceived risk associated with crimes such as robberies. 
Households are forced to increase expenditure on security measures, which  inhibits 
schooling outcomes, since households consequently  spend less on schooling.  Others 
choose to emigrate, resulting in the loss of human capital, which quite often also results 
in physical capital outflow. Alternatively, workers may be kept away from their work 
place as a result of injury or murder. 
 
Although economic growth is important, criminal policy should be aimed at reducing 
crime rather than pursuing economic growth. A clear grasp of the determinants of crime 
is crucially important to ensure that the South African government achieves this goal. 
 
Economic theory suggests that crime prevention should be driven by the criminal justice 
system, which is why reforming the criminal justice system is at the core of the debate 
concerning crime prevention. But is this the most efficient way of combating crime? It 
was shown earlier that many authors have refuted this theory, and given South Africa’s 
history over the past 28 years, it would be difficult to label the criminal justice system an 
efficient and effective deterrent to crime.  
 
Various other factors such as inadequate police training and a corrupt police force have 
been highlighted as determinants of crime. Brown (2001) contended that economic and 
socio-economic variables should also be considered as important determinants of crime. 
She  concluded that economic variables are the strongest determinants of crime, with 
education being the most significant of these variables. In a similar study in South Africa 
Blackmore  (2003)  found that income per capita was the most significant economic 
factors associated with high crime levels, followed by the number of drug- and alcohol-  6 
induced offences (social factor). The most important demographic factors were the 
degree of urbanisation and the ratio of women to men. Both Blackmore and Brown 
concluded that the solution to crime lies in an interdisciplinary approach, including 
various social, economical, political and law enforcement factors. 
 
But just how serious is the crime problem in South Africa and how does the crime 
situation compare internationally? In the next section South Africa’s crime statistics will 
be analysed and compared with that of other countries. 
 
2.4 The magnitude of crime in South Africa compared to the rest of the world 
 
Does South Africa really have a major crime problem? And is the situation becoming 
worse or are matters actually improving? The answer may be illusive. An increase in the 
number of crimes reported is not necessarily an indication that the situation is worsening. 
The efficiency of the criminal justice system could have improved to the extent that 
certain crimes are reported and combated more efficiently. By the same token, a drop in 
the number of crimes reported could be the result of the deteriorating efficiency of the 
criminal justice system. According to a Nedcor crime survey  (in Brown, 2001: 270) 
official crime statistics may underestimate actual incidences of crime by as much as 50%. 
Crime statistics do, however, indicate the broad patterns of crime. 
 
On average, South Africans were subjected to the following crime rates over the period 1 
April 2002 to end-March 2007: Someone was raped every 10 minutes,  a murder or 
attempted murder occurred approximately every 9 minutes, a robbery occurred 
approximately every 2.5 minutes. Somewhere in South Africa someone was assaulted in 
almost every minute of every day. Every 90 seconds someone’s premises (home or work) 
was burgled. Every 36 seconds something was stolen. In total, a serious crime occurred 
every 12 seconds during the period 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2007 (Institute for Security 
Studies, 2007).
 As was indicated in Section 2.3 there were 2.7 private officers for every 
sworn police official in 2005. Without the existence of the private security industry the 
crime statistics would probably have been worse. 
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Table 1 
Crime ratios per 100 000 of the population for selected countries: 2002  
Country 
 
Murder  Rape  Assault  Theft 
(All kinds)  Fraud  Drug 
Offences   
High Income – non-OECD               
Cyprus    1.44  0.26  74.64  95.04  0.39  17.25 
Kuwait    5.02  -  116.03  364.87  7.39  - 
Saudi Arabia    0.77  1.38  5.46  -  -  5.74 
Slovenia    2.49  7.84  95.21  211.46  69.86  30.96 
               
High Income – OECD               
Australia    2.35  8.06  15.92  25.56  5.62  10.25 
Austria    3.76  7.77  434.62  3 743.46  428.07  278.6 
Belgium    27.58  51.5  839.23  923.73  170.65  452.35 
Canada    3.32  19.75  406.26  256.83  68.88  133.07 
Czech Republic    2.24  4.21  67.65  310.41  206.83  20.53 
Denmark    0.61  1.25  102.94  280.92  -  9.88 
Finland    4.25  1.52  217.49  599.66  98.83  145.01 
Germany    1.43  3.17  42.88  236.4  164.47  64.04 
Iceland    2.46  2.82  81.69  185.21  48.24  103.52 
Ireland    1.29  1.77  145.29  204.58  54.46  31.71 
Italy    12.63  6.46  65.49  127.85  39.02  84.73 
Japan    -  1.97  16.76  4.56  9.29  18.48 
Korea, Rep.    1.64  3.86  359.09  33.22  147.3  12.42 
Luxembourg    2.71  1.8  62.61  125.68  11.26  24.77 
Netherlands    0.06  5.82  -  35.49  58.9  88.84 
New Zealand    3.07  11.22  390.84  417.26  83.89  209.6 
Portugal    11.22  0.89  143.4  161.71  30.55  37.21 
Sweden    4.02  2.82  131  307.12  56.46  194.12 
Switzerland    2.5  1.4  29.68  155.79  42.52  103.2 
United Kingdom    2.22  5.02  255.97  373.38  37.48  97.32 
United States    8.87  32.99  310.14  4 739.15  -  - 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Country    Murder  Rape  Assault  Theft 
(All kinds)  Fraud  Drug 
Offences 
Upper Middle Income               
Argentina    22.16  8.32  853.18  2 348.18  -  42.51 
Chile    7.91  5.4  222.55  493.07  46.19  10.91 
Costa Rica    26.68  16.06  57.94  1 320.67  54.06  27.88 
Croatia    5.11  1.52  -  159.19  66.22  112.72 
Hungary    4.15  5.89  192.77  2 188.54  306.16  47.11 
Latvia    7.48  2.31  82.68  837.39  162.01  21.39 
Lithuania    10.44  4.9  42.29  429.75  13.29  16.58 
Mexico    2.23  1.77  -  30.77  7.81  9.77 
Oman    1.3  4.37  36.84  56.74  7.84  16.04 
Panama    9.56  7.21  200.99  466.22  8.88  50.48 
Romania    7.15  4.23  20.7  266.62  22.2  1.57 
Slovak Republic    121.73  3.25  179.21  425.64  109.59  16.94 
South Africa    151.31  115.61  1797.7  3 632.94  124.01  118.67 
Turkey    6.31  2.42  2.78  9.78  1.5  4.17 
Uruguay    13.78  9.02  451  3 007.58  95.03  25.5 
Venezuela    2.31  0.61  0.43  6.96  0.43  3.88 
               
Lower Middle Income               
Albania    17.21  3.87  13.65  63.05  6.22  9.94 
Azerbaijan    2.98  0.32  -  15.84  8.12  24.17 
Belarus    12.3  4.29  -  227.44  22.16  28.57 
El Salvador    21.59  38.38  245.04  224.92  51.94  22.92 
Maldives    8.36  -  98.61  149.47  16.73  - 
Moldova    11.1  5.52  3.1  4.53  2.94  0.19 
Morocco    7.53  4.12  661.57  21.64  101.79  8.08 
Namibia    8.26  14.41  -  3.02  -  - 
Peru    39.46  22.84  33.74  66.78  5.78  - 
Philippines    26.49  -  2.65  -  -  - 
Tunisia    2.91  3.13  517.45  367.97  25.65  8.33 
              
Low Income                
Afghanistan    1.69  0.94  0.6  4.37  0.83  0.47 
Ethiopia    20.04  5.98  114.15  55.68  13.7  0.43 
Myanmar    3.68  1.17  21.48  10.97  4.78  4.72 
Nepal    5.98  1.24  0.54  9.13  1.56  1.24 
Source:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. 
 
How does South Africa’s crime situation compare with that of its international 
counterparts? Although local crime statistics for 2007 are available, comparable 
international crime statistics are not readily available. The most recent international crime 
statistics available for comparison are 2002 figures. After comparing South Africa to the 
55 other countries in Table 1, a top three list was compiled for each of the six categories 
of crime in Table 2. When compared to countries in the middle and lower income   9 
brackets, which is where South Africa is categorised economically, South Africa tops the 
list in every one of these six categories except fraud, where South Africa is placed third. 
 
Table 2 
Countries with highest crime ratios: 2002 (High income countries excluded) 
  Murder  Rape  Assault  Theft  Fraud  Drug 
        (All kinds)    Offences 
1  South Africa  South Africa  South Africa  South Africa  Hungary  South Africa 
2  Slovak Republic El Salvador  Argentina  Uruguay  Latvia  Croatia 
3  Peru  Peru  Morocco  Argentina  South Africa  Panama 
Source:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004. 
 
When the 2002 figures are compared to the situation in 1994 it is clear that there has been 
no improvement with the new democratic dispensation, apart from the fraud category, 
where South Africa dropped  from second to third place. Since 1994 South Africa’s 
position deteriorated for each of the other five categories. South Africa’s crime problem 
has clearly not abated and the country’s criminal justice system faces increasing pressure 
in terms of high crime rates and huge prison populations (Frost in Brown, 2001: 281). 
 
Table 3 
Countries with highest crime ratios: 1994 (High income countries excluded) 
  Murder  Rape  Assault  Theft  Fraud  Drug 
        (All kinds)    Offences 
1  Rwanda  Rwanda  South Africa  South Africa  Hungary  Mauritius 
2  South Africa  South Africa  Botswana  Botswana   South Africa  South Africa 
3  Honduras  Botswana  Zimbabwe  Poland  Mauritius  Zimbabwe 
Source: Crime information management centre, 1994: 1-4. 
 
South Africa’s situation does not improve dramatically when a top three list is compiled 
for all 56 countries, including high income countries. Although South Africa drops to 
seventh and eighth place for fraud and drug offences, respectively, it still tops the list for 
murder, rape, assault and theft. Figure 1 provides  a  scatter graph of logged  Gross 
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Figure 1 
Total crime rates and logged Gross National Income per capita (2002) 
 
Source: Institute for Security Studies, 2007 and The World Bank, 2006.  
 
Although South Africa falls below the trend line in Figure 1 the country emerges as the 
furthest point to the right of the graph, confirming its alarming crime statistics compared 
to other countries. Crime has clearly become a major problem in South Africa. In the next 
section it will be demonstrated that the current situation in South Africa is untenable and 
that combating crime is extremely costly. 
 




The main emphasis in this section is on the excessiveness of government expenditure on 
the criminal justice system. It will be shown that the direct economic cost implications of 
crime for the period 1980-2006, i.e. government expenditure on the police services, 
correctional services and the justice system, were substantial. Two yardsticks will be used 
to determine the excessiveness of this expenditure: An inflation scenario and a social 
services scenario. These scenarios are discussed in more detail in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
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both counts.  A large share  of South Africa’s current dilemma with regard to the 
insufficient provision of social services could perhaps have been prevented had these 
funds been allocated differently. 
 
3.2 Direct economic costs 
 
There can be little doubt that crime does impose costs on an economy but an attempt to 
accurately measure the direct cost implications of crime is perhaps too idealistic. Direct 
private costs could, for example, include the following: expenditure on fire arms, 
insurance, value of goods lost, loss of productivity through injury, the loss of revenue by 




 All these costs impact negatively on the economy, but an attempt to 
isolate that percentage of the private costs that can directly be attributed to crime is a 
taxing – if not impossible – exercise. There are, however, certain costs that can be clearly 
identified (although it must be conceded that our calculations are an underestimation of 
the direct cost of crime). 
The most visible direct cost is incurred by state expenditure on the upkeep of the criminal 
justice system, i.e. police services, correctional services and the justice system. In an 
attempt to fully understand the economic implications of crime in South Africa reference 
must be made to the resources that have been allocated to these three departments. As 
indicated in Table 4, R409 million was spent on the upkeep of the criminal justice system 
in 1980. In the 1994/95 budget year (the first year of the democratic South Africa) about 
R6.7 billion was spent on police services, R1.8 billion on correctional services and R1 
billion on the Department of Justice, amounting to a total expenditure of R9.5 billion 
(South African Report, 1980 and 1995). By 2006/07 these amounts further increased to 
approximately R29.4 billion, R9.6 billion and R6.2 billion respectively, totalling R45.2 
billion (National Treasury, 2007). The question to be asked, however, is whether these 





                                                            
2 It can be argued that the development of the security industry could be seen as a positive spillover effect 
of the high crime rate in South Africa. However, an industry whose existence depends on the high 
incidence of crime can hardly be seen as a positive development.   12 
Table 4 
Government expenditure on the criminal justice system: 1980-2006 
(R'000) 
Year  Police  Correctional Services  Justice  Total 
1980  260 528  99 793  48 874  409 195 
1981  321 265  122 618  53 609  497 492 
1982  379 050  134 305  62 602  575 957 
1983  510 632  200 575  91 580  802 787 
1984  602 282  241 326  140 906  984 514 
1985  863 659  338 762  146 021  1 348 442 
1986  996 922  359 898  186 455  1 543 275 
1987  1 237 952  408 190  211 642  1 857 784 
1988  1 580 345  520 203  241 049  2 341 597 
1989  1 979 926  636 930  280 989  2 897 845 
1990  2 546 350  753 835  363 955  3 664 140 
1991  3 371 740  934 727  492 733  4 799 200 
1992  4 734 789  1 282 472  628 410  6 645 671 
1993  5 931 043  1 540 931  862 697  8 334 671 
1994  6 743 925  1 763 907  1 018 573  9 526 405 
1995  7 346 313  2 160 822  1 281 808  10 788 943 
1996  9 817 900  2 748 000  1 404 800  13 970 700 
1997  11 634 700  3 424 500  1 772 400  16 831 600 
1998  12 843 954  3 962 300  2 209 722  19 015 976 
1999  13 934 698  5 036 096  2 325 302  21 296 096 
2000  14 572 459  5 145 367  2 654 385  22 372 211 
2001  15 597 445  5 474 924  2 737 651  23 810 020 
2002  17 670 435  6 549 171  3 933 456  28 153 062 
2003  19 713 543  7 068 475  4 484 857  31 266 875 
2004  22 692 887  7 849 714  4 966 118  35 508 719 
2005  25 414 522  8 828 792  5 499 366  39 742 680 
2006  29 360 784  9 631 216  6 193 636  45 185 636 
Total  232 660 596  77 217 849   44 293 596  354 171 493  
Source: South African Report, 1980-1997, Department of Finance, 1998-2000  
and National Treasury, 2001-2007.  
 
The South African Police Service (SAPS), the most expensive of the three components of 
the criminal justice system, on average absorbed approximately two-thirds of the total 
cost of the criminal justice system for the period 1980-2006 (South African Report: 1980-
1997, Department of Finance, 1998-2000 and National Treasury, 2001-2007). 
Government expenditure on the SAPS increased substantially during the period 1980-
1994 (e.g. by 43% in 1985 when the state of emergency was declared). On average it 
increased by 11.1% in real terms. From 1994-2006 the growth rate dropped to 6.7% per 
annum in real terms. Expenditure on the SAPS increased from R261 million in 1980 to 
R29.4 billion in 2006 (equal to an annual real growth rate of 8.9% in real terms). 
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Government expenditure on correctional services increased steadily during the entire 
period. For the period 1980-1994 expenditure increased annually at a growth rate of 7.8% 
in real terms and from 1994-2006 by 8.7% per annum. For the period 1980-2006 
government expenditure on correctional services increased from R100 million to R9.6 
billion – equal to an annual real growth rate of 8.2%. 
 
During the period 1980-1994 government expenditure on the justice system increased at a 
moderate rate (except for 1983 and 1984 when it grew by 30.4% and 37.8% respectively 
in real terms), averaging a real growth rate of 9.1% per annum. During the period 1994-
2006 the real growth rate increased moderately to 9.6% per annum. From 1980-2006 the 
average real growth rate was 9.4% per annum. Government funding of the justice system 
increased from R49 million in 1980 to R6.2 billion in 2006. 
 
Figure 2 
Real per capita expenditure (in 2000 prices) on the upkeep of the criminal justice 




Real  per capita expenditure (in constant 2000 prices) on the upkeep of the criminal 
justice system increased from only R138 in 1980 to R712 in 2006 – the equivalent of an 
increase of 413% for the entire period or an average growth rate of 6.5% per annum 
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capita  expenditure  is illustrated in Figure 2.  Total expenditure on the upkeep of the 
criminal justice system in 2006 was 110 times greater than in 1980. Despite the drastic 
increase in expenditure on the criminal justice system since 1980, this has not had the 
desired effect of decreased crime rates.  
 
Was too much spent on the upkeep of the criminal justice system and, if so, what exactly 
has been lost? Can it be said that these funds could have been spent more efficiently 
elsewhere? In the next section the opportunity cost of the funds allocated to the criminal 
justice system will be discussed. 
 
3.3 Opportunity cost 
 
The  criminal justice system  occupies resources that could have been utilised more 
productively  elsewhere in the economy. Was too much money spent on the criminal 
justice system in order to control crime during the period 1980-2006? This section will 
attempt to indicate what the opportunity cost was in terms of foregone expenditure on 
social services. 
 
If the rate of increase in the government’s expenditure on the South African criminal 
justice system is compared to the rate of increase in government expenditure on social 
services it is clear  that for most  of  the period 1980-2006 the rate of increase in 
government expenditure on the criminal justice system has outpaced  that of the 
expenditure on social services. The array of possibilities that could have been realised 
had the resources that were allocated to the criminal justice system, or part thereof, been 
allocated differently, e.g. allocated to social services, will be quantified. This may explain 
why the government has failed to meet the huge demand for basic needs of the majority 
of South Africa’s people. The level of social expenditure on whites during the apartheid 
era was too high to be extended to other groups (Van der Berg, 1989: 200). As a result of 
limited financial resources it was impossible to maintain the expenditure level that whites 
enjoyed prior to 1994 and simply uplift other groups to the same level of expenditure. 
This has resulted in a social expenditure dilemma. 
 
The magnitude of the figures presented in the previous section becomes far more 
apparent when consideration is given to what could have been done with the funds if they 
had been allocated elsewhere in the economy. In order to determine what impact the 
funds could have had if spent differently it is important to determine how much of the   15 
expenditure on the criminal justice system can be regarded as excessive, i.e. assuming 
that a limited amount of expenditure is necessary. 
 
There must be a  norm beyond which government expenditure can be regarded as 
excessive. Two approaches have been adopted to determine this norm. Under  the 
inflation approach it is assumed that expenditure on the criminal justice system increases 
with the inflation rate, whereas the social services scenario views the rate of growth of 
social expenditure by government for the period 1980-2006 as the yardstick. In sections 
3.3.2 and 3.3.3 it will be shown that government expenditure on the South African 
criminal justice system has been excessive in terms of both these norms. 
 
In terms of quantifying the opportunity costs involved in expenditure on the criminal 
justice system, two of South Africa’s main social expenditure categories of need will be 
used:  education and housing.  Empirical research by Brown (2001) indicated that 
education is the most important economic explanatory variable for crime prevention and 
that urbanisation is the most important socio economic variable. The next section will 
outline the shortages in these two categories. 
 
3.3.1 Shortage of schooling and housing facilities 
 
Although it is problematic to pinpoint a specific time when the shortages in schooling and 
housing facilities should be evaluated,  the authors decided to use the backlogs that 
existed after the African National Congress took over political power in 1994. The core 
issue relating to opportunity cost in the field  of education is the lack of educational 
facilities. According to the former Minister of Education Mr Sibusiso Bengu (in South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 1996: 116) there was a shortage of 85 200 classrooms 
at the beginning of 1995. It should be kept in mind that this shortage excluded facilities 
such as toilets, administration blocks and laboratories. The shortage in classrooms was 
then converted to a shortage in schools. 
 
The number of enrolments at primary schools as a percentage of the total number of 
enrolments in 1995 was used as a pro rata estimate for the shortage in primary school 
classrooms (Research Institute for Education Planning, 1995: 4). The same procedure 
was followed to estimate the shortage in secondary school classrooms. Given a classroom 
learner ratio (CLR) of 1:40 for primary schools and 1:35 for secondary schools it was   16 
calculated that there was a shortage of 2 054 primary schools and 914 secondary schools 
in 1995 (as indicated in Table 5).  
 
In terms of the cost per primary school (R30 million) and per secondary school           
(R35 million) the shortage could have been eliminated at a total cost of approximately 
R93.6 billion. Crouch (in South African Institute for Race Relations, 1996: 144) 
estimated the cost of providing the toilets needed in all schools at a ratio of 20 learners 
per toilet at R8 billion in 1995. If this is adjusted using the building index of the Bureau 
for Economic Research (Building index electronically received from Mr Snyman, 2007) 
it converts to R22.8 billion in 2006 prices. Total costs of eliminating the shortage in 
schools would be approximately R116.4 billion. 
 
Table 5 
Number of schools needed in South Africa in 1995 
  Primary schools (1:40)  Secondary schools (1:35) 
Classrooms needed  56 474  28 726 
Learners in need  2 258 960  1 005 410 
Schools needed 
(1 100 learners per school) 
2 054      914 
Source:  South African Report, various issues, Research Institute for Educational 
Planning, 1995: 4 and South African Institute for Race Relations, 1996: 116.  
 
In 1995 it was estimated that 2.18 million new houses would have to be built to alleviate 
the shortage of houses in South Africa (South African Institute for Race Relations, 1996: 
335-361). Allowing for the present direct cost of building a house (excluding the cost of 
land) of R48 700 (Department of Housing, 2007) the total cost of alleviating the housing 
shortage amounts to R106.2 billion. 
 
3.3.2  Inflation Scenario: Government  expenditure on the criminal justice system 
increases with the inflation rate 
 
In this scenario the inflation rate is used as a yardstick in order to determine whether 
government expenditure on the criminal justice system has been excessive. Any increase 
in actual government  expenditure  from 1980 above the inflation threshold is then 
regarded as excessive.  
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If the annual inflation rates for the period 1980-2006 are taken as the appropriate rates of 
increase in government expenditure on the criminal justice system it indicates an 
excessive amount of approximately R288 billion (South African Reserve Bank, various 
issues). The extent of this excess becomes increasingly clear when the figure is translated 
in terms of houses or schools that could have been built. As explained in the previous 
section, the total cost to eliminate backlogs of  classrooms  and toilet facilities in the 
schooling system, amounts to R116.4 billion. To provide the backlog of 2.18 million 
houses would cost an additional R106.2 billion. This means that if the excessive spending 
on the criminal justice system was, instead, devoted to schools and housing there would 
have been no current shortage, and an additional amount of R65.4 billion would still have 
been available to be spent on other social services (See Table 6). This becomes even 
more apparent if the current backlog of 2.4 million houses in South Africa is taken into 
account (Naidoo, 2007: 72), an indication that the situation is deteriorating. Clearly, the 
opportunity cost of excess spending on the criminal justice system was substantial in 
terms of social services that could have been financed instead. 
 
Table 6 









(Number of  
schools/houses 





(Number of  
schools/houses 






1           
   Primary   2 054  2 054  100%  2 054  100% 
   Secondary   914  914  100%  914  100% 
Housing units







                       - 
 
1.  Schools: 
  Cost of primary school with 1 100 learners = R30 million 
  Cost of secondary school with 1 100 learners = R35 million (Personal communication with Mr 
Schreuder, Deputy Director-General at the Western Cape Education Department, 2007) 
2.  Housing units: 
  Current building cost of 30m
2  house converted to a 40m
2  house = R48 700 (Department of 
Housing, 2007) 
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3.3.3  Social Services  Scenario:  Government  expenditure on the criminal justice 
system increases at a rate equal to the increase in government expenditure on 
social services 
 
The second yardstick used is the rate of increase in government expenditure on social 
services (education, health, housing, social security and welfare). Government 
expenditure on social services increased at an average annual rate of approximately 21% 
for the period 1980-1995. For the period 1995-2006 the growth rate was considerably 
lower at just under 13% per annum (South African Report, 1985-1997 and National 
Treasury, 1998-2006). These average growth rates are higher than the inflation rates for 
the respective periods. The average expenditure on social services was used because the 
motive for government expenditure on the containment of crime and violence is 
maintaining social peace. Social expenditure has at its core the same goal. The rationale 
that was followed is that there is no reason why government expenditure as an indirect 
attempt to maintain social peace should exceed a direct attempt at attaining the same 
goal. Therefore the rate of increase in the expenditure on social services should not differ 
greatly from that of the criminal justice system. Table 6 indicates that even if government 
expenditure on the criminal justice system had increased at the same rate as that of the 
expenditure on social services there would still be a substantial opportunity cost involved. 
 
If government expenditure on the criminal justice system since 1980 had increased at the 
same rate as government social expenditure, R138.2 billion could have been saved. In 
other words the shortage in primary and secondary schools could have been eliminated. 
Simultaneously, 447 638 houses (20.5% of the shortage) could also have been financed. 
 
Both these scenarios illustrate the significant opportunity costs involved. At the heart of 
the argument is the age-old dilemma: Too many guns, too little butter. In an attempt to 
combat crime the South African government allocated funds to the upkeep of the criminal 




It is generally held that South Africa has a high crime rate by global standards. It has 
been demonstrated that this is indeed the case and that South Africa, when compared to 
other middle and lower income countries that are plagued by high crime rates, is worst 
afflicted. The South African government is responsible for the implementation of an   19 
action plan against crime. If the government fails in this respect it will eventually be 
exposed as an incapable agent of the people it ought to govern. 
 
The criminal justice system that has been tasked with dealing with the crime problem 
currently costs the South African government approximately R45.2 billion per annum. 
Funds allocated to the upkeep of the criminal justice system are non-productive in nature 
and desperately needed in other sectors of the economy.  
 
Has the government spent too much on criminal justice? Government expenditure on the 
criminal justice system cannot be regarded as excessive per se. There has to be a specific 
level that  the  government  is required to  spend on the criminal justice system. Both 
yardsticks used in this paper, the inflation rate and the rate of increase in expenditure on 
social services, indicate that the government’s expenditure on criminal justice has been 
excessive. 
 
Both the inflation  scenario and the social services scenario were compared to actual 
government expenditure on the South African criminal justice system. It was indicated 
that for the period 1980-2006 the South African government could have saved an amount 
of more than R288 billion, by the inflation scenario, and approximately R138 billion by 
the social services scenario. After considering the needs within the field of education both 
scenarios  indicated that the current backlog could have been prevented had  these 
opportunity cost funds been allocated differently. It was further shown that under the 
inflation scenario the housing shortage could also have been eliminated and an additional 
amount of R65 billion would still have been available for expenditure on other social 
services. In accordance with the social services scenario, the schooling shortage as well 
as 21% of the housing shortage could have been met. 
 
In conclusion thus it was shown that South Africa’s crime rate is high by global 
comparison. It was also shown that South Africans suffered considerable opportunity 
costs in terms of foregone social services expenditure as a result of the high crime rate. 
More specifically these opportunity costs involved two of the major social services need 
areas in South Africa: education and housing. Ironically, education and housing were also 
shown to be two of the main determinants of changes in the crime rate. 
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